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ABSTRACT
THE GREAT RECESSION’S IMPACT ON THE COUNTIES OF ILLINOIS:
DID STIMULUS SPENDING AND COLLABORATION CREATE JOBS?
Lawrence E. Vaupel, Jr., Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Michael Peddle, Director
This study analyzes the state of Illinois during the Great Recession and in the postrecession recovery and explains the variance among the counties in terms of job loss and job
creation. Utilizing data from the Illinois General Assembly Legislative Research Unit, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) website, and the Illinois Department of
Employment Security, this study explores the relationships among variables that represent
employment, economic stimulus spending, participation in regional economic development
programs, and diverse employment bases to understand which variables best predict stimulus
spending, job losses and job creation before, during, and after the Great Recession. The
findings conclude that stimulus spending in Illinois was driven by population and not
economic need. County job gains during the subsequent recovery were predominantly
predicted by the number of job losses during the recession. Stimulus spending had a small but
statistically significant predictive value. Participation in a federal economic development
district had a statistically significant but negative effect on predicting job growth. The author
suggests communities strive to retain their job capacity during recessionary business cycles
and policy makers develop apolitical ways to direct future stimulus spending programs to
secure more significant economic impacts.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Great Recession of 2007-2009 was the most severe U.S. economic contraction
since the immediate post-World War II period. The effects rippled across most every sector of
the economy including finance, housing, manufacturing, retail, and entertainment. By April
2010, the recession affected 39 percent of the households in the U.S. either by job loss, late
mortgage payments, or experiencing negative equity in their home. Many of the effects of the
Great Recession are still being felt six years beyond the official end (Hurd & Rohwedder,
2010).
The consensus among scholars is that a housing bubble, fueled by the need for everincreasing home values, burst when those values reached their peak in 2006 and 2007. Even
with these warning signs, most investors, banks, government officials, and economists
continued to be optimistic about the future. Banks and investment firms who had invested in
securities backed by mortgages that were now beginning to go into default began to collapse
as their balance sheets were taking huge losses. Once Lehman Brothers collapsed in
September of 2008, the market responded by selling off stocks in large quantities (Lansing,
2011).
This stock market crash of 2008 set off a tightening of credit across the financial
industry. Lending for every activity became much more stringent as banks were trying to
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assess their losses and limit further exposure to the mortgage crisis. Businesses that were not
able to borrow to meet their cash flow needs began laying off workers. The credit crunch
caused by the financial crisis fueled unemployment, which, in turn, fueled more mortgage
defaults and bank losses. This financial crisis turned what was already an economic slowdown
into the largest economic contraction since 1947 (Farmer, 2012; Keeley & Love, 2010;
Lansing, 2011; Verick & Islam, 2010).
Compounding the negative effects of the recession is the reality that many other
economic indicators had been trending downward even before the official start of the
recession. Fernald (2014) found that manufacturing productivity had actually been declining
in the three year period leading up to the recession. This downward trend in productivity only
exacerbated the problems and slowed the subsequent rate of recovery.
Unemployment rates continued to rise across the U.S. and disproportionately affected
men, the young, those employed in the manufacturing industry, African-Americans, and noncollege workers. When laid off, it was taking older workers longer to find employment. Those
in their fifties would experience the most severe wage losses. In total, the Great Recession
claimed 8.7 million jobs across the United States (Johnson & Burtica, 2012; Katz, 2010).
The lasting effects of the Great Recession are still being felt throughout the U.S.
economy. Many states have just now regained the number of jobs they lost during the
recession. However, wage levels are still below pre-recession levels. Consumer spending has
not fully recovered and will be seven percent below pre-recession levels in most U.S. cities
for some considerable time. The decade of 2000-2011 widened the income inequality gap (the
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90/10 ratio) by nearly 20 percent (Chernick, Langley & Reschovsky, 2011; Meyer & Sullivan,
2013).
The Federal Reserve Board is commissioned by Congress and given the task of
maintaining “maximum” employment, stable prices, and moderate interest rates over the long
term. The Federal Open Market Committee recently calculated that the longer-run normal rate
of employment “had a central tendency of 5.0-5.2 percen.t” While the August 2015
employment numbers put the unemployment rate within this range, there are still thousands of
workers underemployed and the workforce participation rate is at an historic low level of 62.6
percent (Garver, 2015; Palley, 2015)
The U.S. government responded to the Great Recession with a stimulus spending
program, bank and auto industry bailouts, an extension of unemployment insurance benefits,
foreclosure assistance, and more oversight of the banking industry. The Great Recession has
produced a prolific amount of research as to the cause and cure of the economic crisis, as well
as the effectiveness of the government’s response. This research lays the groundwork for
analyzing the effectiveness of local economic development policy through the lens of a
federal countercyclical stimulus spending program. Initially, the paper explores previous
research relating to the 2009 stimulus program and its effect on unemployment. It also
explores economic development best practices and theory as it relates to collaboration and
sustainability. I then build upon the existing body of research by testing competing theories
using a data set comprised of financial and demographic information for the 102 counties in
the state of Illinois. I answer the general research questions of whether or not the stimulus
spending program created jobs and if those counties that collaborated regionally with
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economic development programs with a diverse employment base fared better during the
Great Recession than those counties that did not.
The results of this research will help educate policy makers and economic
development professionals about matters relating to economic development strategies and
programs. This research tests “best practices” proclaimed by both theorists and practitioners.
Policy makers and economic developers will benefit from knowing the answers to these
question as they strive to build economically sustainable communities. They will be better
informed about the most effective ways in which to deal with issues of unemployment during
the next recessionary business cycle. Practitioners spend valuable resources trying to improve
their local economy by following the best practices of economic developers across the U.S.
Did these best practices, specifically regional collaboration and a diversified employment
base, help communities save and create jobs during the Great Recession?

CHAPTER 2
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND THE GREAT RECESSION

The Great Recession has produced numerous research projects and academic studies
by both political scientists and economists. These studies have drawn disparate conclusions
about the effectiveness of the economic development programs, monetary policy, and fiscal
policy undertaken since 2007. A review of the literature finds that previous research in these
areas has produced mixed results for predictive power, but more consistent and useful results
for explanatory purposes.
Unemployment and the “Jobless” Recovery

One of the most devastating economic effects of the Great Recession was the loss of
jobs. As aggregate demand began to fall across the economy and lending became more
difficult, employers (especially newer firms) began to lay off workers in record numbers. All
told, the Great Recession eliminated 7.8 million U.S. jobs. Typically, recessionary periods
have acted as a cleansing process for the economy. During such times, resources are shifted to
the most efficient and productive activities. However, the high unemployment rate and the
credit crisis led to young firms being more negatively impacted than more established firms,
even though they may have been more efficient (Foster, Grim & Haltiwanger, 2014).
Financing constraints experienced by small businesses had a significant impact on
unemployment, especially for those businesses like manufacturing that are heavily dependent
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upon credit. Not only did the lack of credit increase unemployment, but it also acted to
suppress the rate of business formation. Between 2007 and 2009, the decline in small business
lending accounted for 20 percent of job losses in firms with fewer than 20 employees, 16
percent of the total U.S. job losses and 30 percent of the decline in wages. Researchers found
that solving the credit crisis for small businesses during the Great Recession would have
saved over 850,000 jobs (Duygan-Bump & Lerkov, 2015; Greenstone, Mas, & Nguyen,
2014).
The combined issues of significant unemployment rates and a slow jobs recovery led
many to conclude that the U.S. jobs market is not as flexible as it once was, especially during
recessionary periods. Fueling the slow jobs recovery is the fact that U.S. productivity had
actually been slowing during the three year period leading up to the recession. Additionally,
income based mortgage modification programs may have incentivized unemployed workers
to stay in their home instead of relocating to find a job (Farber, 2012; Fernald, 2014; Freeman,
2012; Herkenhoff & Ohanian, 2011).
Job losses during recessions are often concentrated in the middle of the skill
distribution spectrum. The skill distribution spectrum ranges from jobs that require very little
training beyond a high school education (low skill) to those requiring advanced college
degrees and highly specialized training (high skill). The Great Recession was no different in
this regard. There exists a fundamental skills mismatch in the economy and when this factor is
combined with a weak housing market, high levels of unemployment result (Estevao &
Tsounta, 2011). A “jobless” recovery emerges as firms innovate to become more efficient and
raise productivity without hiring more employees. The result is lower demand for workers in
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middle skill occupations and increased job polarization between low skill and high skill
workers. This results in long-term unemployment for those caught in the middle. When they
do reenter the workforce, they may experience significant wage losses. Displaced workers
during mass layoffs can expect to lose 2.8 years’ worth of income when the unemployment
rate is above 8 percent (Davis, Von Wachter, Hall, & Rogerson, 2011; Jaimovich & Siu,
2012; McGrattan & Prescott, 2012; Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe, 2012).
Unemployment during the Great Recession was experienced by certain demographic
profiles more than others. Speaking during an interview with David Leonhardt, President
Barack Obama in 2009 pointed out that the unemployment rate for those with a high school
diploma is three times what it is for those with a college degree. He advised, “…your
likelihood of getting a job that pays you a good, solid middle-class wage is vastly increased
upon graduating from college” (Leonhardt, 2009).
Along with non-college workers, men, especially those employed in the
manufacturing industry, who are African-Americans, and are younger experienced high levels
of unemployment. Underemployment (those working part-time because they cannot find fulltime employment) was also more likely to occur among workers who were less educated,
worked in low skill occupations, were paid low wages, and lived in lower income households.
When older adults in higher wage jobs were laid off, they typically experienced longer
periods of unemployment and significant wage losses upon finding a job (Anderson, 2012;
Johnson & Butrica, 2012; Katz, 2010; Sum & Khatiwada, 2010.)
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Government Response

The U.S. Government responded to the problem of unemployment by extending the
payment period for unemployment insurance benefits from 26 weeks to 99 weeks. Most
scholars have found that increasing the duration of unemployment benefits did have a
negative impact on the unemployment rate, however, the degree to which the government
policy affected unemployment is debated by scholars (Elsby, Hobijn, & Sahin, 2010; Farber
and Valetta, 2011; Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, & Mitman, 2013; Mazumder, 2011;
Nakajima, 2012; Neumann, Fishback, & Kantor, 2010). Most studies suggest the influence of
the extension of unemployment benefits on the unemployment rate to be between .1 percent
and 1.4 percent. While this may seem to be a small effect, when there are millions of people
counted among the unemployed, a 1.4 percent impact accounts for 30 percent of the increase
in unemployment between 2007 and 2010. Rothstein (2011), found that the extension of
payments had a smaller effect on the unemployment rate arguing that only .1 to .5 percent of
the unemployment rate could be attributed to the increase in unemployment insurance
payments.
Still other scholars argue that the negative impact associated with the extension of
unemployment benefits is somewhat offset by the economic stimulus the payments produce
by increasing the purchasing power of the unemployed (Farber and Valetta, 2011). This may
especially be true for workers with low skill levels and low levels of savings who would
otherwise leave the job market when benefits expire and enter welfare programs. Farber and
Valletta (2011, 2013) found that the elimination of the extended benefits would likely
decrease the amount of time receiving unemployment by only one week. Others found that the
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benefits did not create work disincentives and were successful in keeping the unemployed
engaged in the labor market (Howell and Azizoglu, 2011; Rothstein, 2011).
While short-term employment may have benefited from the stimulus spending
program, the long-term effects of the spending may have resulted in a reduction of private
consumption and investment. This crowding out effect can, in theory, prolong a recessionary
period. An increase in government spending (demand) will cause an increase in output and
hours, but will lower wages and productivity (Cwik, Volker, Gurkaynak, & Cova, 2011;
Nekarda and Ramey, 2011). And, this secondary effect is what might cause a recessionary
period to be extended.
Studies on the effect of monetary policy used to increase demand during a recession
have also produced mixed findings. Ireland (2011) finds that the near zero interest rates in
effect at the beginning of the recession prohibited the government from enacted monetary
policy that could have otherwise increased consumer demand. On the other hand, Woodford
(2011) found that government spending through welfare programs could produce a multiplier
in excess of one, even if interest rates cannot be lowered through monetary policy. Research
on the spending programs under the Roosevelt administration provided similarly mixed
results. Under the fiscal policy of the New Deal, positive growth in employment and earnings
resulted. However, the positive shocks supplied by the subsequent spending program, led to a
decrease in employment and increase in earnings consistent with a crowding out effect
(Almunia, Benetriz, Eichengreen, O’Rouke & Rua, 2010). In summary, positive short-term
economic impacts can be created from monetary and fiscal policy intervention programs,
however, the long-term impacts of these programs are difficult to quantify.
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Researchers have found that the high unemployment rate during the Great Recession
produced at least one positive aspect for the macro-economy. Entrepreneurship rates rose
during the latter part of the recession as those unable to find work started their own businesses
to support themselves and their families. Researchers find that as the unemployment rate
increases, people are more likely to look for a permanent job while also starting their own
business. This is especially true when the short-term prospects for finding a job are low
(Aaronson, Rissman, & Sullivan, 2004; Fairlie, 2013).

Did the Stimulus Spending Program Work?

Much like the congressional debates that took place over the type of fiscal policy that
would yield the most effective outcomes during the recession of 2007-09, the early scholarly
debates also centered on whether tax cuts or stimulus spending was the best action to take.
Post-recession research, however, focused on the effectiveness of the stimulus spending
program, especially the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which was
enacted by Congress and the president. Again, much of the scholarly work produced mixed
results (Alesina, 2012; Barro & Redlick, 2009).
Keynesian economic policy advocates stimulus in the form of increased government
spending during times of recession in order to drive up aggregate demand. This expansionary
policy is expected to move the economy closer to full employment as demand is increased
across the economy and firms rehire workers to increase output. However, post-recession
studies show that location and type of spending is important if the desired outcomes are to be
achieved. The stimulus program taught us that the job multipliers vary greatly depending
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upon the local unemployment levels (higher is better), the industries being stimulated
(manufacturing among the highest), and where the marginal propensity to consume the
product is high. Ideally, stimulus spending would have the most significant positive effects if
all three of these criteria are met (Aizenman & Jinjarak, 2011; Auerbach, Gale, & Harris,
2010; Young & Sobel, 2011).
Based upon these findings, ARRA turned out to be less effective than it could have
been. The decision-making process for where increased spending would take place and which
industries were to be stimulated was a political process orchestrated by members of Congress,
who often had parochial motives. Young and Sobel (2011) found that political factors such as
tenure of a state’s Representatives and Senators and committee assignments were key factors
in determining how much stimulus funding a state received. Not only was the spending
seemingly misappropriated for maximum effectiveness, Atesoglu’s (2013) model revealed
that the amount of ARRA spending was not enough to move the economy to full employment
and thus did not produce the desired effect on unemployment.
These mixed findings on the effectiveness of the ARRA spending program can be
explained by the varying types of models used in the analysis, the differing assumptions made
by the researchers, the variables used in the analysis, and also by the level of government
studied. As Parker (2011) explains, most economic models used to measure success of fiscal
policy assume that fiscal policy is as effective during recessionary periods as it is during
expansionary periods. This assumption makes measuring the multiplier effects difficult during
recessions and could be a cause of the disparate findings among scholars.
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Most scholars conclude that the stimulus spending program was effective at producing
a multiplier effect throughout the economy. However, the size of the ripple effect in the
economy varies depending upon the type of stimulus spending and the study. Feyrer and
Sacerdote (2011) found that ARRA produced an overall job multiplier effect between .5 and
1.0. The job multiplier effect is the number of jobs created elsewhere in the economy from the
job funded by the stimulus spending. They found that the construction programs and welfare
enhancing programs for low income households had the greatest expansionary effects. These
programs alone produced a multiplier effect of 2.0 and cost approximately $100,000 per job.
The education grants had little expansionary benefits and reduced the overall multiplier effect
of ARRA. A list of industries and their associated job multiplier ratios can be found in
Appendix A.
Other scholars (Wilson 2012) found the multiplier for construction spending to be the
most effective, resulting in a 19 percent boost in employment and saving two million jobs
initially. However, by 2010, that number had been reduced to 800,000. On average, for each
$100,000 of ARRA transfers to the states, 3.8 net job years were produced and 3.2 of these
were produced in outside of the public sector, the healthcare industry, and education. A study
across all 50 states found that the first year of ARRA spending yielded eight jobs per million
dollars spent ($125,000 per job) (Chodorow-Reich, Feiveson, Liscow, & Woolston, 2012;
Wilson, 2012).
Stimulus spending was found to be most effective during the credit crisis of 2008 and
2009. Banks were not lending at a normal rate and, therefore, the stimulus spending was one
of the few ways in which the economy was able to increase demand. Additionally, with
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interest rates constrained near zero, the Federal Reserve was limited in their ability to increase
the money supply by reducing interest rates. Multiplier rates for debt financed stimulus
spending was found to range between .8 and 1.5, however during recessionary periods, these
programs can have a more robust multiplier effect (Almunia, Benetrix, Eichengreen,
O’Rourke, & Rua, 2010; Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2011; Ramey, 2011).
When compared to other countries, the U.S. experienced a lower level of net fiscal
stimulus. One explanation for this is that state and local government spending was actually
reduced because of ARRA. Instead of using their own debt financing for infrastructure
projects, state and local jurisdiction often replaced bond financing with ARRA financing to
complete their shovel-ready projects. In these cases, the stimulus spending did not act as
additional money flowing into the economy. Instead, the ARRA funds were a replacement for
other funds that would have gone into the economy without ARRA. Another explanation that
was alluded to above is that the decisions on where to spend the funds were made politically,
rather than based upon where they would have the largest multiplier effects across the
economy (Aizenman & Pasricha, 2013; Cogan & Taylor, 2010; Young & Sobel, 2011).
Blinder and Zandi (2010) created a model that measured the effects of the stimulus
program and government intervention policies and produced some staggering results. They
found that without the various intervention and spending programs the Great Recession would
have become the “Great Depression 2.0.” They claim that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
2010 would have been 11.5 percent lower, there would have been an additional 8.5 million
jobs lost, and potentially damaging levels of deflation would have occurred. The effects of
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the stimulus spending programs alone increased GDP by 3.4 percent, held the unemployment
rate about 1.5 percent lower, and added 2.7 million jobs to the economy.

Economic Development Policy and the Great Recession

This paper explores the relationships that exist between unemployment rates, stimulus
spending, community demographics, industrial composition and levels of collaboration in
Illinois counties. Beyers (2013) found that industry clusters were a significant factor in
determining the unemployment rate through the Great Recession. The unemployment rate
varied significantly between the states and this variance was primarily due to the types of
industry clusters represented in the state. Other factors shown to have a statistically
significant effect on unemployment include public policies, tax rates, and government
spending. Reese and Ye (2011) found that public policies that reduce crime and increase high
school graduation rates lead to an increase in a municipality’s economic health (Canova,
Pappa, & Surico, 2011; Erickcek & McKinney, 2006; Wu, 2012),
Economic development policy has evolved away from incentive based programs and
to encourage diverse regional economies. Despite previous research that questioned the
effectiveness of business incentives and a call for economic development policy to focus on
correcting market failures such as unemployment and underemployment, municipalities are
offering business incentives at the highest level in ten years (Bartik, 1990; Goss & Phillips,
1999; Zheng & Warner, 2010; Osgood, Opp, & Bernotky, 2012; Reese, 2013). Economic
development best practices also advocates for a diversified employment base. This diversity
has been shown to facilitate cross-fertilization of ideas across industries (Jacobs, 1969), foster
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innovation that fuels economic growth (Duranton & Puba, 2001), and nurture the growth of
high-tech firms (Henderson, et.al, 1995).
Economic development best practices call for seemingly contrary notions
simultaneously. On the one hand, best practices call for a diversified economy that will better
withstand economic downturns similar to an individual stock portfolio (Anderson, et al,
2010). On the other hand, cluster-based economic development is a staple of economic
development practice since Porter’s seminal work on the subject (1990). This has led to a call
for diversification within broader industrial clusters within a regional context (Kemeny &
Storper, 2015).
This paper posits that the presence of regional (multi-county economic development
districts) economic development programs will have a positive effect on employment. The
rationale behind this assertion is that regional efforts will be more effective at producing
success, but also that the existence of regional programs indicate a level of cooperation rather
than competition between local government units. This is in spite of Gordan’s (2007)
findings that Illinois municipalities often will state they support cooperation in economic
development efforts, but structural issues promote competition instead.
Regional economic development programs are promoted as a best practice by
economic development practitioners for two primary reasons. First, regional economies can
share strengths and, thereby, make themselves more competitive in the global competition for
jobs. Second, it has understood, by most, that attracting jobs that land in another community,
yet close enough to offer employment opportunities for another community’s residents are
worth pursuing. The presence of regional economic development corporations have been
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shown to positively affect employment in Texas as long as their activities are focused on
industrial development and not just quality of life activities. A regional industrial recruitment
effort in upstate New York has also produced positive results from a collaborative effort
(Jarmon, Vanderleeuw, Pennington, & Sowers, 2012; Knudson, 2012).
This collaboration among units of government on a regional basis has been defined as
“coopertition.” Watson and Morris (2008) coined this term to define the situation in which a
unit of government acts to be more competitive by joining forces with other units of
government to solve community issues. Economic development is one example of how
communities make themselves more competitive for projects by marketing the assets of other
government agencies, e.g. housing affordability, transportation network, educated workforce,
etc. Coopertition is more important in a global economy in which local governments are
competing globally for job producing developments (Lombard & Morris, 2010; Watson &
Morris, 2008).
Communities face many headwinds when considering collaborating on economic
development projects. Historically, economic development has been characterized by
competition between communities to attract new business through the use of local land use
policies or incentives. Collaboration is often impeded by structural, societal process, and
leadership barriers. However, communities have been successful in collaborating to attract
these projects when transaction costs are low and joint gains can be quantified (Feiock,
Steinacker & Park, 2009). Communities that have similar economic issues and different
socioeconomic demographics have been shown to collaborate more often (Feiock, Lee, &
Park, 2012). City governments depend upon partnerships, alliances, and joint ventures to fuel
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success. Building a mutual trust between the key players and maintaining stable governmental
structures are essential for fostering collaboration (Arganoff & McGuire, 1998;Smith, 2009;
Warm, 2011).
Unfortunately, cooperation and a shared vision are not always prevalent. Communities
forced to deal with a plant closure have been slow to react because of the lack of a shared
vision among government and community leaders. A 1995 study on the effects of the 1988
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) showed that it has not been
effective in averting plant closings, however it has been successful at assisting displaced
workers in obtaining assistance in finding new employment (Mayer & Greenberg, 2001;
Portz, 1995).

The Federal Economic Development Administration

Regional collaboration is highly valued by the lead economic development agency in
the federal government. The U.S. Commerce Department’s Economic Development
Administration (EDA) is the primary mechanism through which federal economic
development funds flow from the national government to state and local government
agencies. According to the EDA’s website, their mission is, “to lead the federal economic
development agenda by promoting innovation and competitiveness, preparing American
regions for growth and success in the worldwide economy.” The website further states that
they strive to “establish a foundation for sustainable job growth and the building of durable
regional economies throughout the United States.” Still more, this foundation is built by using
two key mechanisms; “innovation and regional collaboration” (EDA, n.d.). According to the
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EDA, regional collaboration is essential for economic recovery and those regions that work
together have more success than those that do not.
The EDA makes strategic investments (grants and loans) at the local level in order to
help facilitate the creation of jobs and the attraction of private investment. The agency offers a
variety of resources and programs including, “technical assistance, post-disaster recovery
assistance, trade adjustment support, strategic planning, and research and evaluation
capacity.” Regional collaboration has increasingly become a funding criteria used to judge the
worthiness of EDA applications. The agency puts a high priority on projects that combine
multiple governmental agencies or a regional convener of agencies in order to address
regional economic development issues (EDA, n.d.).”
The academic debate over the effectiveness of EDA’s programs is far from resolved.
Many scholars have called for a more comprehensive review of EDA’s approach to funding
local projects along with a quantitative assessment model to determine the outcome of these
programs. Others have argued for a repurposing of EDA’s programs to focus on planning and
technical assistance at the local level and research at the federal level. There have been
demands for consolidation of programs to eliminate waste and redundancy and a call to
clearly distinguish the differences between community development and economic
development. Markusen and Glasmeier (2008) call for programs to have a greater emphasis
on human capital and be better coordinated at the regional level. The priorities for EDA’s
funding have come under scrutiny as well. Hall’s (2010) research of Kentucky’s 120 counties
found that funding was directed towards more rural areas in the state at the expense of the
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need for funding urban projects which could have produced greater economic benefits (Hill,
1998; Singerman, 2008; Thornburgh, 1998; Watts et al., 2011).
Despite the consistent and seemingly constant demands for reform, scholars have
found some EDA programs effective. The success of EDA programs is found in areas of
planning and technical assistance as well as producing employment opportunities via public
works projects. The fact that three-fourths of the counties in Illinois are part of an Economic
Development District and that these counties include both rural and urban geographies will set
up an interesting dynamic when the issue of unemployment is analyzed. Participating in a
federal Economic Development District requires multi-agency collaboration in creating either
a regional economic development strategy (Haughwout, 1999; Reese & Fasenfest, 2003).
This review of the prevailing literature on the effects of the Great Recession, ARRA,
and the value of regional cooperation has exposed insights into the variables that might
explain variation in employment rates in Illinois counties. Specifically, we learnthat certain
employment sectors were more negatively impacted than others, that regional cooperation in
the form of federal Economic Development Districts could have led to securing an increased
amount of stimulus funds, and a diversified economy should foster job growth. This research
will explore these concepts in depth by analyzing Illinois counties during the Great Recession
and subsequent recovery.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

This research explores the relationships that existed in Illinois counties between
stimulus spending, job losses and growth, collaboration, and diversity of employment base
during and after the Great Recession. Building upon the theory and research of those scholars
discussed in Chapter 2, as well as best practices as a practitioner of economic development, I
have developed four hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation. The remainder of Chapter 3
lays out the hypotheses, describes the data that was used in this analysis, and explains the
analysis that was performed on the data.

Stimulus Spending and Employment

The debate among scholars and economists over the effectiveness of the federal
stimulus spending program continues even though the Great Recession ended almost six years
ago. This paper explores the effectiveness of stimulus spending at the county level in Illinois.
I predict that those counties that experienced the highest levels of unemployment prerecession and during the recession, were also the counties more likely to enact stimulus
spending programs in order to create jobs. I further argue that those counties that spent higher
amounts of stimulus spending were more likely to create jobs and increase employment for
their residents (Blinder & Zandi, 2010; Canova et al., 2011; Wilson, 2012).
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First, I hypothesize that the number of unemployed residents can predict the amount of
stimulus spending undertaken by a county. My argument states that the more unemployed
residents in the county, the higher the amount of stimulus spending will be. This hypothesis
can be written as, H1: Higher levels of unemployment predicts higher levels of stimulus
spending at the county level. The second hypotheses is that higher levels of stimulus spending
will lead to a higher level of employment in the county. It can be written as, H2: Stimulus
spending can predict employment gains at the county level.

Collaboration During the Great Recession
The topic of collaboration, or “coopertition” as defined by Watson and Morris (2008)
to describe units of government working together to make themselves more competitive for
economic development success will also be explored in this research. Collaboration is defined
simply as the existence of a multi-county federal economic development district (EDD).By
comparing those counties in an EDD to those not participating in an EDD, we can also
measure the value of being part of an EDD in terms of job creation.
I expect to find that counties participating in regional economic development
programs have had more success during the recession than those counties where no regional
effort exists. I posit that those counties participating in regional initiatives experienced fewer
job losses, lower unemployment rates and more job gains. Since federal EDA dollars flow
through these EDDs, they should have been able to capture more stimulus spending for their
counties, in addition to the federal stimulus funds.
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These hypotheses can be written as H3a: Illinois counties participating in regional
economic development programs experienced lower levels of job losses during the Great
Recession. H3b: Illinois counties participating in regional economic development programs
experienced lower unemployment rates pre-recession. H3c: Illinois counties participating in
regional economic development programs experienced more job gains 2010-2012. H3d:
Illinois counties participating in regional economic development programs spent more
stimulus funds.

Diverse Employment Base

Research has shown that goods producing industries were among the hardest hit
during the Great Recession. Research has also shown that the ARRA spending produced jobs
in certain industry sectors more than others. A best practice among economic development
professionals is to diversify the tax base and employment base to avoid having all the
proverbial eggs in one basket. I test the wisdom of this practice by using countywide data
from the State of Illinois. Based upon theory and practice, I expect that counties with a more
diverse employment base experienced fewer job losses than other counties during the Great
Recession (Chodorow-Reich et al., 2012; Katz, 2010).
These hypotheses can be written as follows. H4a: Counties with a diversified
employment base experienced fewer job losses during the Great Recession. H4b: Counties
with a diversified employment base experienced more job gains 2010-2012.

23
The Data

Most of the data used in this research was found in the Illinois County Data Book
published by the Legislative Research Unit for the Illinois General Assembly (2013). The
Data Book contains information pertaining to the demographic, political and economic
composition of each of the counties in Illinois. To supplement this database to include
information relating to jobs and employment, I used data found on the Illinois Department of
Employment Services website. Data was also gathered from the federal government’s website
for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to track the amount of stimulus spending
for each of the counties in Illinois. The amount of stimulus spending is the amount spent
through March 31, 2011. Population numbers are the official 2010 census numbers found in
the Data Book. Stimulus spending per capita is the amount of stimulus spending through
March 2011 divided by the 2010 population of the county. Pre-recession employment
numbers are from December 2007. Post-recession employment numbers are from March 2011
and January 2012.

The Analysis

In order to understand which factors best predict employment and stimulus spending,
regression analysis will be performed to measure the impact of various factors while holding
others constant. I created a variable that represents the number of employed residents in 2007
and again in early 2011 to determine how many “job losses” occurred by county. For the first
hypotheses, I posit that job losses will be able to predict stimulus spending. Besides job losses
being an important predictor, other independent variables such as the political leanings of the
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county and the county budget could predict the amount of stimulus spending and will be
included in the analysis.
For the second hypothesis, a dependent variable was created to represent the job gains
in a county between 2010 and 2012 by subtracting the number of employed residents in 2012
from the number employed in 2010. I posit that the independent variable of stimulus spending
will predict job gains and have a positive relationship. Other independent variables that could
have significance when predicting job gains are the education level of the county, the number
of jobs lost during the recession and the types of industries present in the county.
In order to assess whether or not collaboration had a positive effect on employment
during the Great Recession, I conducted a comparison between those participating in a
regional economic development effort and those that do not. A regional approach for this
study is defined as a multi-county economic development program. Many of the federal
EDDs comprise multiple counties. I conducted a t-test for equality of means between the two
groups and determine if the differences between the means were statistically significant in the
areas of pre-recession unemployment rate, job losses during the recession, stimulus spending,
change in unemployment rate, percentage of job growth, and job gains from 2010-1012. I
posit that the group of counties participating in regional economic development activities
experienced fewer job losses, attracted more stimulus spending, and had more job growth than
those counties that did not have a regional initiative.
Finally, I created a variable that represents a diversified employment base for the
counties. The Data Book provides a breakdown of the percentage of jobs found in each of the
major job categories. I used this data to create an index that measures how diversified the jobs
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base is. I performed a t-test for equality of means to determine any significant differences
between how the counties with diverse employment performed during the recession versus
counties with less jobs diversity. I expect that the counties with diversified employment
experienced fewer job losses during the recession and more job gains 2010-2012. I also posit
that they experienced lower unemployment rates pre and post-recession.
There are two special considerations to be noted for this analysis. First, it is difficult to
measure the issue of unemployment on a county basis. This is because people will often
commute across county boundaries for employment purposes. A person employed in County
A who lives in County B is counted in the workforce of County A. However, if the person
should become laid-off from the job in County A, the person will become part of the
unemployed workforce in County B. It should be noted that when I refer to “job gains” in my
research, I am referring to an increase in the number of jobs in a county, even if the new job
may be filled by a resident of a different county. When analyzing unemployment rates, it is
important to remember that discouraged workers who stop working for a job are no longer
counted as unemployed workers and this scenario can actually decrease the unemployment
rate.
Secondly, the number of cases where counties do not collaborate is relatively small.
Of the 102 counties in Illinois, only 25 of them do not participate in a regional economic
development program as I have defined it. This small sample size should be considered before
generalizing these findings outside of the scope of this research.

CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH FINDINGS

This dissertation analyzes the data from Illinois counties prior to, during, and after the
Great Recession to determine what factors predicted the use of stimulus spending, if stimulus
spending was effective in creating jobs, and if counties exhibiting a regional approach to
economic development and having a more diverse employment base performed better from an
employment basis during the recession. Appendix B contains a list of variables that were
used to perform this analysis. The variables are both socioeconomic and political
The first hypothesis is that stimulus spending can be predicted based upon
unemployment and job losses. This hypothesis can be written as, H1: Higher levels of
unemployment predicts higher levels of stimulus spending at the county level. To test this
hypothesis, I used regression analysis with a dependent variable representing the amount of
stimulus spending at the county level. Based upon the research of other scholars discussed
above, I included independent variables relating to the job losses and unemployment rate, the
types of industries found in the county, the education level of residents, and political
composition of the county. The results of my research indicate that the population related
factors were statistically significant predictors for the use of stimulus spending at the county
level. Variables representing presidential election outcome, education level, industry types,
and the presence of a regional economic development program were not found to be
statistically significant.
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A simple bivariate regression using the dependent variable representing stimulus
spending and the independent variable for pre-recession unemployment rate indicated that the
unemployment rate was not statistically significant in predicting stimulus spending. I ran
multiple regression scenarios with different variables representing population including the
number of unemployed persons and total county tax revenue. All indications are that the main
driver of stimulus spending is positively correlated to population. To enhance these findings, I
performed a stepwise regression analysis on the stimulus spending variable using variables
that were found to be statistically significant in the regression analysis above. These variables
included population, pre-recession number of unemployed and total county tax revenue.
Model 3 of the stepwise regression analysis (see Table 1) explains 97 percent of the
variance in stimulus spending among the counties in Illinois. Total tax revenue is highly
correlated with population, as is the number of unemployed pre-recession. Essentially,
stimulus funds were distributed across Illinois based upon population. Interestingly, the
relationship between stimulus spending and the number of unemployed pre-recession is
negative. I found that the number of unemployed pre-recession was a small factor in
predicting less stimulus funding at the county level. This is contrary to what I had posited.
However, this finding is consistent with other research noted previously that found stimulus
funds were not directed towards areas of higher unemployment.
The importance of each variable in predicting the amount of the variance in stimulus
spending is indicated by the standardized coefficient estimates in Table 1. The standardized
coefficient estimates indicate that the variables relating to the total county tax revenue and the
number of unemployed persons pre-recession are weighted heavily in this model. The
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Table 1
Dependent Variable: Stimulus Spending
Model 1
2.21 x
107

Constant
3.69
Total Tax
Revenue

0.957
32.902

Number of
unemployed,
prerecession
Population
R2
adj R2
F-stat
N

-

Model 2
3.02 x 107
6.143

Model 3
3.1 x 107

2.578
11.958

8.527
2.620
16.48

1.631
-7.564

-2.385
-13.328

-

-

0.915
0.915
1082.513
102

0.946
0.945
874.117
102

.729
9.174
0.971
0.970
1100.309
102

Note: t-stats listed under standardized coefficient estimates

population variable has less of an impact on the model, but population and total tax revenue
are highly correlated.
The second part of this research is to determine if stimulus spending can predict job
gains. H2: Stimulus spending can predict employment gains at the county level. For this
analysis, I created a dependent variable that represents the number of jobs added (or
subtracted) in the county from 2010 to 2012. A simple bivariate regression analysis using
stimulus spending as the independent variable produced an R-squared ratio of .89. However,
as we saw in the H1 analysis above, stimulus spending was highly correlated with population.
I then used the job gains 2010-2012 dependent variable in a regression analysis that included
predictor variables that represented the amount of stimulus spending, the number of jobs lost
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between 2008 and 2010, the presence of a regional economic development program, a diverse
employment base, stimulus spending, and the number of jobs in the various industries found
in the county.
The analysis indicates that stimulus spending was indeed a predictor of job gains and
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. However, the major contributor to
predicting job gains was the variable representing the number of job losses 2008-2010. The
presence of a regional economic development program was also statistically significant, but in
an inverse relationship to job gains. A diverse employment base was not statistically
significant.
Using these statistically significant variables from the regression analysis above, I ran
a stepwise regression analysis in order to determine which variable carries the most weight in
predicting job gains. The number of job losses 2008-2010 can explain 96% of the variance in
job gains among the counties in Illinois. The factors of regional economic development and
stimulus spending enhanced the predictive power of the model slightly. Similar findings were
produced when using the post-recession unemployment rate and percentage of job growth
2010-2012. Quite simply, the counties that lost the most jobs during the recession were the
ones to attract the most job growth during the recovery regardless of the amount of stimulus
spending (see Table 2).
The standardized coefficient estimates indicate that the variable representing the
number of job losses 2008-10 has the most weight in the model. The presence of a regional
economic development program and the amount of stimulus spending are statistically
significant, but do not add much predictive power to the model. Based upon the analysis,
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Table 2
Dependent Variable: Job Gains 2010-2012
Model 1
Constant

Job losses 2008-2010
Regional economic
development program
Amount of stimulus spending
R2
adj R2
F-stat
N

-271.17
-2.72

Model 2
348.67
1.78

Model 3
139.15
.67

.981
51.15
-

.965
51.52
-.068
-3.613

.835
15.846
-.055
-2.896

.963
.963
2616.301
102

.967
.967
1472.337
102

.141
2.613
0.970
0.969
1041.619
102

Note: t-stats listed under standardized coefficient estimates

stimulus spending is statistically significant in predicting job gains. The null hypothesis for
for H2 can be rejected. The analysis also indicates that the presence of a regional economic
development program has the opposite effect on job growth than what has been posited.
The third set of hypotheses of this dissertation relate to the effectiveness of
implementing a regional approach to economic development in creating and retaining jobs.
These hypotheses are: H3a: Illinois counties participating in regional economic development
programs experienced lower levels of job losses during the Great Recession. H3b: Illinois
counties participating in regional economic development programs experienced lower
unemployment rates pre-recession. H3c: Illinois counties participating in regional economic
development programs experienced more job gains 2010-2012. H3d: Illinois counties
participating in regional economic development programs spent more stimulus funds. For this
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analysis, I performed an Independent Samples t-test on the two groups; those that participate
in a formal regional approach to economic development and those that do not. For purposes of
this analysis, I defined “regional approach” to mean participation in a multi-county federal
economic development district.
The comparison of means between the two groups indicates that those counties taking
a regional approach experienced fewer job losses between 2008 and 2010 on average than
those that did not (see Table 3). However, the counties taking a regional approach
experienced fewer job gains between 2010 and 2012 and had slightly higher unemployment
rates on average than the other counties. This is consistent with the regression analysis
performed above that indicated being part of a regional economic development program had a
negative relationship to job growth. The differences in the mean unemployment rates were
only .2 percent higher in both 2008 and 2012. The groups experienced nearly the same
percentage increase in the unemployment rate from 2008 to 2012.
The t-test results in Table 4 indicate that being part of a regional economic
development program was statistically significant when comparing the means of the two
groups on variables relating to job losses, job gains, percentage of job growth, the change in
unemployment rate, and stimulus spending. In other words, it is highly unlikely that these
differences between the groups occurred by chance. However, the differences between the
means for the pre and post-recession unemployment rates were not statistically significant at
the 95 percent confidence level.
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Table 3
Regional Economic Development
N

Unemployment Rate 2008

Unemployment Rate 2012

Job Losses 2008-2010

Job Gains 2010-2012

Stimulus Spending
Percent Job Growth 20102012
Change in Unemployment
Rate 2010-2012

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Standard Error
Mean

No

25

5.82

1.19

.23

Yes

77

6.08

1.25

.14

No

25

8.80

1.24

.24

Yes

77

9.01

4.11

.46

No

25

12796

38963

7792

Yes

77

1394

2222

253

No

25

3536

9882

1976

Yes

77

-100

588

67

No

25

179778294

390446802

78089360

Yes

77

29002934

26840191

3058723

No

25

.003

.021

.004

Yes

77

-.012

.023

.002

No

25

4.04

1.30

.26

Yes

77

3.4

1.04

.12

Table 4
t Test, Regional Economic Development
Levene’s Test
for
Equality of
Variances
F
Sig.

t

df

Sig.
2-tailed

t-Test for Equality of Means
Mean
Std. Error
difference
Difference

95 percent Conf. Interval
Lower
Upper

Unemployment Rate 2008
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

.023

.879

-.914
-.937

100
42.531

.363
.354

-.2618
-.2618

.2865
.2794

-.8302
-.8255

.3066
.3019

Unemployment Rate 2012
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

.494

.484

-.257
-.406

100
99.76

.798
.686

-.2156
-.215

.8382
.531

-1.878
-1.269

1.447
.838

Job Losses 2008-2010
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

21.04

.000

2.58
1.462

100
24.05

.002
.157

3637.69
11402.38

1120.65
7796.73

1414.34
-4687.48

5861
27492.26

Job Gains 2010-2012
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

27.36

.000

3.246
1.839

100
24.055

.011
.078

11402.38
3637.697

4416.419
1977.593

2640.34
-443.357

20164.43
7718.751

Percent Job Growth 2010-2012
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

.292

.590

2.932
3.038

100
43.338

.004
.004

.0153
.0153

.005
.005

.004
.005

.025
.025

1.021

.315

2.557
2.281

100
34.498

.012
.029

.656
.656

.256
.288

.147
.071

1.165
1.24

23.876

.000

3.399
1.929

100
24.074

.001
.066

150775360
150775360

44358570
78149241

62769219
-10490627

238781501
312041348

Change in Unemployment Rate
2010-2012
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed
Stimulus Spending
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed
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The final hypothesis in this study relates to the common economic development
practice to diversify the job base in order to prevent significant job loss during recessionary
business cycles. The hypothesis is stated as, H4: Counties with a diversified employment base
experienced lower levels of unemployment during the Great Recession.
For this analysis, I created a dichotomous variable representing the diversity of a
county’s employment base. The State of Illinois grouped all job types into one of ten distinct
industry clusters. An explanation of how this grouping was performed is found in Appendix
B. For the purposes of this analysis, a county was determined to have a diversified
employment base if at least five of these ten industry clusters each contained 10 percent or
more of the total jobs. This resulted in 54 counties without a diversified employment base and
48 with a diversified employment base. By performing t-tests to compare the means of the
two groups, we can determine if having a diverse employment base was a statistically
significant factor on the test variables relating to pre and post-recession unemployment rates,
job losses, and job gains.
On average, those counties with a diversified employment base experienced seven
times more job losses during the Great Recession than those with a less diverse jobs base.
However, during the recovery period of 2010-2012, these diversified counties also
experienced more than 1000 times the amount of job gains on average, while the less diverse
counties were still experiencing job losses (on average) (see Table 5). Considering the finding
in H2 above, this variance could be explained by the simple fact that the diversified counties
had more jobs to lose and then had more jobs to recover during the subsequent recovery. This
brings up an interesting concept of job capacity that I will discuss further in the next chapter. I
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believe this has important implications for policy makers and economic development
professionals.

Table 5
Diverse Employment Base
N

Mean

Unemployment Rate 2008

No
Yes

54
48

6.046
5.985

Standard
Deviation
1.2968
1.1938

Standard Error
Mean
0.1765
0.1723

Unemployment Rate 2012

No
Yes

54
48

8.469
8.713

1.3695
1.2574

Job Losses 2008-2010

No
Yes

54
48

1082.54
7683.33

2297.259
28388.356

312.617
4097.506

Job Gains 2010-2012

No
Yes

54
48

-60.72
1748.63

490.799
7328.063

66.789
1057.715

Percent Job Growth 20102012

No
Yes

54
48

-.0146
-.0016

Change in Unemployment
Rate 2010-2012

No
Yes

54
48

3.33
3.838

0.1864
0.1815

.0232
.0222
1.1
1.148

.0031
.0032
.15
.166

The Independent-Samples t-test results shown in Table 6 indicate that the difference
between the means of the diverse and non-diverse counties is statistically significant at the 95
percent confidence level for the variables of Percent Job Growth 2010-12 and Change in
Unemployment Rate 2010-12. These variables were introduced because the raw numbers of
job losses and gains were so disparate for the two groups. This finding indicates that
diversified counties performed better at adding jobs during the recovery than the others. For
the variables relating to pre and post-recession unemployment rates and raw number of job
losses and job gains, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant.

Table 6
t Test, Diverse Employment Base
Levene’s Test for
Equality of
Variances
F
Sig.

t-Test for Equality of Means
t

df

Sig.
2-tailed

Mean
difference

Std. Error
Difference

95 percent Conf.
Interval
Lower
Upper

Unemployment Rate 2008
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

.222

.638

.246
.247

100
99.86

.806
.806

.0609
.0609

.2479
.2466

-.4309
-.4285

.5526
.5502

Unemployment Rate 2012
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

.137

.712

-.933
-.938

100
99.89

.353
.351

-.2440
-.2440

.2615
.2601

-.7627
-.7601

.2747
.2721

Job Losses 2008-2010
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

7.612

.007

-1.703
-1.606

100
47.56

.092
.115

-6600.8
-6600.8

3875
4109.41

-14288.6
-14865.4

1087.05
1663.77

Job Gains 2010-2012
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed

10.397

.002

-1.811
-1.707

100
47.37

.073
.094

-1809.35
-1809.35

999.11
1059.82

-3791.56
-3940.98

172.87
322.23

.071

.791

-2.89
-2.89

100
99.4

.005
.005

-.013
-.013

.0045
.0045

-.0219
-.0219

-.0041
-.004

.119

.731

-2.282
-2.276

100
97.4

.025
.025

-.5079
-.5079

.2225
.2231

-.9493
-.9506

-.0664
-.0651

Percent Job Growth 2010-2012
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed
Change in Unemployment Rate
2010-2012
Equal Variances Assumed
Equal Variances Not Assumed
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The Great Recession was the most devastating economic downturn in the United
States since the Great Depression. It negatively impacted nearly 4 of every 10 households in
the US. Even now, nearly six years after it officially came to an end, many areas of the US
have yet to regain the jobs that were lost. In the end, the Great Recession claimed the jobs of
8.7 million Americans. As an economic development practitioner, I witnessed first-hand the
consequences the Great Recession had on businesses, entrepreneurs, workers and
communities.

Summary of Study

During and after the Great Recession, I began to question certain economic
development “best practices” and public policies as the ability of these programs to curtail the
negative effects of the recession seemed limited. It seemed to me that the policies and
practices being advocated by the economic development profession conflicted in some ways
to what I was witnessing as a practitioner. I wondered what steps communities could take to
better defend themselves against recessionary business cycles and if stimulus spending had
the desired effect of job creation. These questions began to take the form of research
questions and then hypotheses that were addressed in this study. The hypotheses for this study
are: H1: Higher levels of unemployment predicts higher levels of stimulus spending at the
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county level. H2: Stimulus spending can predict employment gains at the county level. H3a:
Illinois counties participating in regional economic development programs experienced lower
levels of job losses during the Great Recession. H3b: Illinois counties participating in regional
economic development programs experienced lower unemployment rates pre-recession. H3c:
Illinois counties participating in regional economic development programs experienced more
job gains 2010-2012. H3d: Illinois counties participating in regional economic development
programs spent more stimulus funds. H4a: Counties with a diversified employment base
experienced fewer job losses during the Great Recession. H4b: Counties with a diversified
employment base experienced more job gains 2010-2012.
The majority of the data used for this study came from the Illinois County Data Book
published by the Legislative Research Unit for the Illinois General Assembly (2013). This
book includes information for each county in Illinois including a breakdown of employment
by industry, recent election results at the county-level, the amount of various forms of tax
revenue, and demographic information. Unemployment data was gathered from the Illinois
Department of Employment Services website. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) information and spending was gathered from the federal government’s ARRA
website.
SPSS software was used to analyze the data and test the hypotheses. Regression
analysis was performed in order to test if unemployment could predict the dependent variable
of stimulus spending and if stimulus spending could predict the dependent variable for job
creation. Regression analysis was utilized because of its ability to hold other independent
variables that could be affecting the dependent variable “constant” while testing the
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hypotheses. Stepwise regression allows us to discover which variables explain the most
variance and understand the incremental amount other variables add to the predictive power
of the equation.
For the hypotheses H3 and H4, I utilized an Independent Samples t-test
to compare and contrast regional economic development collaborators with non-collaborators
and those counties with a diverse employment base with those without a diverse base. I also
tested the significance of these factors to determine if these differences were substantive or if
they could occur by chance. Performing a Levene’s Test for equality of variances informs us
whether or not the differences of means between the two groups for a particular variable is
statistically significant. Noting the differences between the two groups is interesting, but it is
more insightful to know if the differences occurred by coincidence or not.

Interpretations of Findings

The first hypothesis of this dissertation is H1: Higher levels of unemployment predicts
higher levels of stimulus spending at the county level. As noted in Chapter 4 and illustrated in
Table 1, the variable representing the pre-recession unemployment rate was not statistically
significant in predicting stimulus spending at the county level. The only employment variable
shown to be statistically significant was the raw number of pre-recession unemployed.
However, this appears to be an intervening variable that is substituting for the population of
the county. Population and the associated total tax revenue variable were also shown to be
statistically significant and can explain almost all of the variance (+91%) in stimulus spending
across Illinois counties.
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Interestingly, the relationship between the pre-recession numbers of unemployed is
inversely related to stimulus spending. While statistically significant, it does not produce the
type of relationship posited in H1. For this reason the null hypothesis for H1 cannot be
rejected. One possible explanation for this finding was noted in the research of Young and
Sobel (2011), where they reminded us that the decision on where to spend the stimulus funds
was a political one and did not necessarily flow to the areas having the most economic need.
The second hypotheses of this dissertation is H2: Stimulus spending can predict
employment gains at the county level. Based upon previous research mentioned above and
conventional wisdom, I expected that the more a county spent in stimulus programs, the more
job gains it would experience after the spending took place. I performed a simple bivariate
regression analysis with the dependent variable representing job gains 2010-2012 and the
independent variable representing stimulus spending. These are highly correlated variables
and the regression analysis resulted in an R-squared factor of .89.
To build this model further, I regressed numerous independent variables upon a
dependent variable representing the number of jobs gained in the period 2010-2012. In H3, I
posit that those counties with a regional economic development program will spend more
stimulus funds because they will have increased access to federal funds through the EDA. In
H4, I posit that counties with a diversified employment base will perform better in terms of
employment. To enhance these analyses, I included the dichotomous variables for the
participation in a regional economic development program and the presence of a diversified
employment base in this regression analysis. I also included the variable representing the raw
number of jobs lost 2008-2010. The variables representing job losses 2008-2010, stimulus
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spending, and regional economic development programs were found to be statistically
significant. The variable relating to diversified employment was not significant.
I performed a similar analysis using the post-recession unemployment rate as the
dependent variable and substituting the pre-recession unemployment rate for the job losses
2001-2010 variable. Interestingly, only the pre-recession unemployment rate and the regional
economic development variables were statistically significant. Stimulus spending was not
significant. I then added the various variables relating to the number of jobs in each of the ten
industry classifications to determine if certain industries were significant in predicting the
post-recession unemployment rate. In this scenario, only the pre-recession unemployment rate
was statistically significant.
Table 2 contains the results of a stepwise regression that was performed using the
variables shown to be statistically significant above. The models show that 96% of the
variance in job gains can be explained by the number of job losses. Quite simply, the counties
that lost the most jobs during the recession were the counties that experienced more job
growth during the recovery. This is a recurring finding in this dissertation. I refer to this
phenomena as “job capacity” and will elaborate on the topic below. Stimulus spending, while
significant, had negligible predictive power. The participation in a regional economic
development program actually had a negative relationship to job gains.
One possible explanation for this negligible effect from the amount of stimulus
spending is that while the spending was associated with a particular county, the workers may
have been counted in a different county. This is especially possible for construction related
jobs where highway construction workers often travel for their jobs. Additionally, as noted
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above by numerous scholars, the effectiveness of ARRA programs for creating permanent
jobs is still in doubt. Quite often, stimulus spending was not directed towards creating jobs
that have the largest ripple effects across the economy in the form of job multipliers. For that
reason, many of the jobs vanished once the stimulus funds ran out (Aizenman & Jinjarak,
2011; Atesoglu, 2013; Auerbach, Gale & Harris, 2010; Young & Sobel, 2011).
The third set of hypotheses of this dissertation relate to the effectiveness of
implementing a regional approach to economic development in creating and retaining jobs.
These hypotheses are: H3a: Illinois counties participating in regional economic development
programs experienced lower levels of job losses during the Great Recession. H3b: Illinois
counties participating in regional economic development programs experienced lower
unemployment rates pre-recession. H3c: Illinois counties participating in regional economic
development programs experienced more job gains 2010-2012. H3d: Illinois counties
participating in regional economic development programs spent more stimulus funds. For this
analysis, I performed an Independent Samples t-test on the two groups; those that participate
in a formal regional approach to economic development and those that do not. For purposes of
this analysis, I defined “regional approach” to mean participation in a multi-county federal
economic development district.
The comparison of means between the two groups (Table 3) indicates that those
counties utilizing a regional approach experienced significantly fewer job losses between
2008 and 2010 on average than those that did not. However, the counties taking a regional
approach also experienced fewer job gains between 2010 and 2012 and had slightly higher
unemployment rates on average than the other counties. This is consistent with the regression
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analysis performed above that indicated being part of a regional economic development
program had a negative relationship to job growth. The differences in the mean
unemployment rates were only .2 percent higher in both 2008 and 2012. The groups
experienced nearly the same percentage increase in the unemployment rate from 2008 to
2012.
The t-test results in Table 4 indicate that being part of a regional economic
development program was statistically significant when comparing the means of the two
groups on variables relating to job losses, job gains, percentage of job growth, change in
unemployment rate, and stimulus spending. In other words, it is highly unlikely that these
differences between the groups occurred by chance. However, the differences between the
means for the pre and post-recession unemployment rates were not statistically significant at
the 95 percent confidence level.
Based upon the finding above, the null hypothesis for H3a: Illinois counties
participating in regional economic development programs experienced lower levels of job
losses during the Great Recession: can be rejected, as participating counties did experience a
lower level of job losses on average and the t-test revealed that the variable was indeed
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The same can be said for H3d
relating to these counties securing more stimulus funding. However, the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected for the other two hypotheses relating to pre-recession unemployment rates
and job gains 2010-2012.
Regional participation in an economic development program did not have the positive
effects I was anticipating. On average, those counties participating in a regional economic
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development program actually experienced a higher pre-recession unemployment rate and had
fewer job gains 2010-2012 compared to the non-participating counties. There are some
possible explanations for these findings. First, in order to participate in a Federal Economic
Development District, a county must be economically disadvantaged. It must have lower
incomes and higher unemployment than the state average. A possible explanation for the
lower job creation numbers could coincide with the fact that the non-participating counties
experienced larger job losses from 2008-2010, and, therefore, had more capacity for job
creation during 2010-2012. The non-participating counties had more jobs to gain simply
because they had lost so many during the recession. This finding aligns with the conclusions
drawn from the research relating to job gains in H2. The theme of job capacity is one that I
will return to at the end of this paper.
The final hypotheses in this study relates to the common economic development
practice to diversify the job base in order to prevent significant job loss during recessionary
business cycles. The hypotheses are stated as, H4a: Counties with a diversified employment
base experienced lower levels of unemployment during the Great Recession. H4b: Counties
with a diversified employment base experienced more job gains 2010-2012. As illustrated in
Tables 5 and 6, the null hypothesis for H4a cannot be rejected, but the null hypothesis for H4b
relating to job gains can be rejected.
Counties with a diverse employment base actually experienced a seven times greater
number of job losses from 2008-2010 than did the counties with a non-diverse employment
base. These counties also experienced over 1000 times the number of job gains 2010-2012
than did the counties with a non-diverse employment base. The diverse counties added over
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1700 jobs on average, while the non-diverse counties were still losing jobs. However, these
variables were not found to be statistically significant using Levene’s Test for equality of
variances. Two variables that were shown to be statistically significant include the percentage
of job growth and the change in unemployment rate. The percentage of job growth in reality
measured the percentage of job losses, as counties in both groups still have fewer jobs on
average in 2012 than they did in 2008. The diverse counties performed better in terms of job
growth as a percentage of pre-recession number of jobs. The measurement for the change in
unemployment rate similarly reported that unemployment rates were higher in 2012 than in
2008. Therefore, a lower amount of change indicates that the unemployment rate had risen
less by 2012. The less diverse counties performed better in this regard.
It was surprising to find that the more diverse economies experienced more job losses
on average. A central tenet of economic development theory is that a diverse economy is a
strong and resilient economy. These findings simply do not support this notion as I strongly as
I thought they would. A possible explanation is that the counties with a diverse employment
base had more jobs going into the recession and, therefore, more jobs to lose. Another
possible explanation is that the counties with less diverse employment bases were less reliant
on industries that were hardest hit during the recession. These counties could have had fewer
government and social service jobs and more agriculture related jobs pre-recession and,
therefore, did not suffer as many job losses.
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Limitations of Research

There are a few limiting factors of this research that should be considered before
generalizing the findings to a broader population. The first is that this study only includes the
counties in the State of Illinois. Illinois was especially hard hit during the Great Recession
and, therefore, there could be some distinguishing characteristics of Illinois that make it
different from other states. Other states may have used different mechanisms for distributing
stimulus funds, had a different means for collecting tax revenue, more or fewer counties per
capita, etc. All of these factors could alter the finding of this research if it were to be
replicated using data from another state.
A second limitation for this study is the use of county geography as the area of study.
As stipulated previously, county geography does not always coincide nicely with employment
centers and more regional economies. Commuting in and out of counties for work purposes is
common in Illinois. This fact could negatively impact counties that serve as a bedroom
community in a regional economy, as their residents employed in another county would
actually count in their unemployment figures if they were to become unemployed. This is one
reason that I thought it was important to discuss regional economic development and create a
variable that represents regional collaboration.
Finally, while the Great Recession and the subsequent government response (ARRA)
were economic issues and an economic response to it, the fact remains that many decisions
relating to the spending and allocation of the ARRA funds were political decisions. This is
important to remember when discussing the effectiveness of stimulus spending. While my
research indicates that stimulus spending actually had a negative effect on job creation, it is
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important to remember that political decisions are not always measured by effectiveness and
efficiency. It is possible that stimulus spending flowed to counties with political clout and to
those with more “shovel-ready” projects without any economic modeling or cost-benefit
analysis being considered. For example, stimulus programs may have funded teacher salaries
because the teacher’s union lobbied for the program and secured the funding, not because this
spending would produce the largest job multiplier.

Suggestions for Future Research

The concept of job capacity is important and something that I kept coming back to
when analyzing the data in this study. During the economic recovery, jobs seemed to have
flowed first to those areas that experienced significant job losses during the recession. The
findings of the analysis for H2 (job gains), H3 (regional collaboration) and H4 (diversified
employment bases) each found that areas that suffered the most job losses were the areas to
secure the most job gains during the subsequent recovery. I suggest that this occurred because
these areas had the available job capacity and job growth simply occurred where it was most
easily created. The idea seems rudimentary, but I do not recall this being a reason given to
explain job growth during the recovery. I worked in the Riverside, CA metropolitan statistics
area during the recovery and remember being able to boast about the area leading the country
in job growth. However, the experts did not offer the fact that we had the job capacity
available because the area led the country in job losses during the recession. Of course, this
isn’t always the case, as Detroit, MI illustrates. Further research into this concept could help
identify ways in which policy makers and economic developers create or retain job capacity
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during economic downturns so that job creation can readily come during the subsequent
recovery. Perhaps the creation of business incubators or the funding of worker training and
tenant improvements during recessions will add to an economy’s job capacity so that job
creation more readily comes during economic recovery.
Regional collaboration in economic development programs should be continued to be
an area of scholarly research. While conventional wisdom seems to indicate that this is an
effective and efficient use of resources, the findings in this study suggest otherwise. One of
the issues researchers face when studying this concept is that data does not readily align with
regional boundaries. This is especially true when a regional boundary crosses state lines. This
issue will grow in importance as the trend towards regional collaboration in economic
development continues. Research could also be done to explore the possibility that once a
regional effort is established, communities lose a competitive edge locally to attract economic
development. If communities become content to allow a regional organization to do their
bidding for them, accountability for local results could become diminished.
Finally, research should focus on creating apolitical ways in which government can
participate in economic development. The recent program announced by the State of
California called California Competes may be a good example of how economic development
funding and incentives can be directed towards projects that produce the largest multiplier
across the economy. This program utilizes a small panel of decision makers that rely upon
cost-benefit analysis when determining which projects receive tax credits. Their meetings and
analysis are open to public scrutiny and comment, yet not so easily influenced by political
donations and lobbyists as a pure political decision can be. Perhaps this program or a similar
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one can serve as a model for future federal stimulus programs to ensure stimulus spending
secures the largest amount of economic benefits as possible.
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APPENDIX A
INDUSTRIES AND ASSOCIATED JOB MULTIPLIER RATIOS
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NAICS Codes

State of Illinois Grouping

Multiplier per Job

400

Construction

1.6

70

Farming

.93

900, 1000, 1100

Information, Finance, Real
Estate

1.7-2.3

500, 800

Manufacturing, Transportation

1.3-8.2

1200, 1300, 1400,
1500

Business, Education, Health
Services

.5-1.5

1600

Health and Social Services

.57-.96

100, 200, 300

Forestry, Mining, Utilities

2-3.69

600, 700

Wholesale and Retail Trade

.71-1.2

1700, 1800, 1900

Other Services

1.5

APPENDIX B
VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS

%const

Description
Percentage of population with BS
degree
Percentage of jobs in Business and
Education
Number of jobs in Business and
Education
Change in unemployment rate 20122008
Percentage of jobs in Construction

const#

Number of jobs in Construction

0

85466

2659.22

9005.274

diversity

Diverse employment base
Regional Economic Development
Program
Percentage of jobs in Farming

0

1

.47

.502

0

1

.75

.432

0.0%

23.3%

6.925%

5.0199%

0

15157

1107.51

2035.121

0.0%

18.4%

1.615%

3.0895%

0

13989

437.90

1505.851

$

$384

$12.10

$41.748

.5%

36.1%

15.200%

4.9931%

13

247158

7474.68

25567.096

0

1

.96

.195

75.6%

93.4%

86.344%

3.8051%

0.0%

19.6%

6.311%

5.9897%

0

274877

5856.60

27799.669

0.0%

31.0%

8.386%

4.0367%

%Bsdegree
%busedu
busedu#
changeinurate

EDD
%farm
farm#

fueltax

Number of jobs in Farming
Percentage of jobs in Forestry,
Mining, Utilities
Number of jobs in Forestry, Mining,
Utilities
Total amount of fuel tax

%gov

Percentage of jobs in Government

gov#

Number of jobs in Government

10gov

2010 election results for Governor
Percentage of population graduated
High School
Percentage of jobs in Health and
Social Services
Number of jobs in Health and Social
Services
Percentage of jobs in Insurance,
Finance, Real Estate

%FMU
fmu#

% Hsgrads
%HSS
hss#
%IFRe

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

8.3%

45.3%

18.777%

7.5636%

0.0%

24.1%

6.394%

4.6119%

0

498936

9004.71

50936.581

.70

6.70

3.5686

1.14485

0.0%

9.1%

5.141%

1.8318%
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incometax

Description
Number of jobs in Insurance,
Finance, Real Estate
Total income tax revenue

jobgainpercent

Percentage of job gains 2010-2012

jobgains1012

jobloss0810perc

Raw number of job gains 2010-2012
Raw number of job losses 20082010
Percentage of job loss 2008-2010

-12.63

15.76

5.9077

4.01952

jobs2012

Raw number of jobs in 2012

1527

2358039

58749.76

241182.334

%manuf

Percentage of jobs in Manufacturing

0.0%

35.4%

11.865%

6.7454%

manuf#

Number of jobs in Manufacturing

0

256398

6755.53

26414.556

%Oserv

Percentage of jobs in Other Sevices

0.0%

22.6%

11.938%

3.8906%

oserv#

Number of jobs in Other Services

0

339554

7990.79

34474.795

Population

Total population

4320

5194675

125790.51

527293.369

postjobs

1558

2309888

57959.03

236162.256

166

246988

6122.95

25139.496

4.6

15.3

9.586

1.7109

1744

2556876

64081.98

261261.149

prejobs

Raw number of jobs post-recession
Raw number of unemployed postrecession
Unemployment rate post-recession
Raw number of workforce postrecession
Raw number of jobs pre-recession

1551

2502842

62147.82

255736.878

08pres

2008 Presidential election results

0

1

.55

.500

12pres

0

1

.77

.420

103

140576

3554.35

14267.807

preurate

2012 Presidential election results
Raw number of unemployed prerecession
Pre-recession unemployment rate

3.0

9.4

6.018

1.2436

prewrkfce

Pre-recession number of workforce

1706

2643418

65702.18

269976.293

ifre#

jobloss0810

postunem
posturate
postworkfce

preunem

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

0

330314

6834.52

33493.089

$1

$3,614

$84.57

$376.292

-.06

.08

-.0085

.02355

-2477

48151

790.74

5093.077

-6798

192954

4188.79

19716.844
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proptax
RevPerPreJob
salesusetax

Description
Total property tax revenue
Total tax revenue per job
Total sales and use tax revenue

Minimum
$2

Maximum
$10,719

Mean
$236.39

Std. Deviation
$1,107.658

2465.84

11907.13

4902.3819

1599.07087

$1

$3,536

$94.82

$369.866

Minimum
93.53

Maximum
13982.90

Mean
2460.6190

Std. Deviation
2529.37006

3820526

1824320593

65957679.17

202522523.223

$94.07

$4,533.53

$990.5500

$608.08609

$4,400,000

$18,253,500,000

$427,871,568.63

$1,893,611,832.806

$107

$80,050

$4,460.42

$10,101.985

stimperprejob

Description
Stimulus spending per job

Stimulus
spending

Total amount of stimulus spending

stipcapita

Stimulus spending per capita

totaltaxrevenue

Total tax revenue

taxrevpercap

Tax revenue per capita

unem2012

Raw number of unemployed in 2012

156

251810

5797.41

25492.258

urate2012

Unemployment in 2012

4.3

11.6

8.583

1.3171

wholeret#

Number of wholesale and retail jobs
Percentage of jobs in Wholesale and
Retail
Number of workforce in 2012

77

272567

8033.70

29042.001

4.1%

19.7%

13.688%

3.0210%

1707

2609849

64547.18

266639.362

%WholRet
wrkfce2012
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